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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
WILLIAm H. NIcHOLSON, JR.*
LIABILITY FOR RE SULT OF M]EDICAL TREATMENT
In the case of Whitfield v. Daniel Construction Company,1 an em-
ployee suffered a compensable head injury and employer's physician
administered a barbiturate which, under certain circumstances, has
an inebriating effect. The employee's death in an accident caused
by his driving a truck off the highway under the influence of such
barbiturate was held compensable. Numerous citations are given
in support of the rule that the aggravation of an injury by medical
treatment necessitated by an original compensable injury, and new
injuries resulting indirectly from the original injury, or from inocu-
lation of an employee at employer's request or for his benefit, are
compensable.
The CODM oF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 Section 72-306
relieves the employer for liability in damages at law for malpractice
by his physician or surgeon but establishes the consequence of such
malpractice "as part of the injury resulting from the accident" and
makes it compensable as such. It is not yet clear, however, whether
the Court, in construing this statute, would preclude injuries arising
from the malpractice or negligence of the employee's physician and
refuse to adopt the rule prevalent in some states as set forth in 71
Corpus Juris, Workmen's Compensation, Section 395:
"Where the chain of causation is not broken, it is not material
that the immediate cause of injury or death is due to the mis-
take or negligence of attending physicians where they act honest-
ly, even though such malpractice was that of the employee's
own physician or surgeon where there was no negligence in his
selection."
INJURnis RN ROUTE To EmPLOYEE'S HOME
Two additional cases were decided in which the Court held under
the particular circumstances that the employee's injuries did not fall
within exceptions to general rule-that an employee going to and
from the place of work is not in the course of employment.
In the case of Sylvan v. Sylvan Bros.2 it was held that the injury
oAttomey-at-Law, Greenwood, S. C.; LL.B., 1943, University of South Carolina, School
of Law.
1. 226 S.C. 37, 83 S.E. 2d 460 (1954).
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of an executive who was carrying business papers for work in his
hotel room which was his home, and who had a fall on an icy street,
was not compensable, where the executive was not paid an hourly
wage during the period he was in transit and the employer did not
pay the hotel bill. The court concluded that work at the hotel was
done for his own convenience. The court alluded to the danger of
preferential treatment for professinnal men who customarily do some
work at home over that accorded to the physical laborer who would
not ordinarily have such homework, if a rule to the contrary were
adopted.
Justice Taylor dissented on the grounds that the place of residence
(hotel) had become a situs of employment and that, at the time of
the injury, the employee was on his way from one place of business
to another.
In the other case, White v. S. C. State Highway Dept.,$ a mechanic
fared, legally, no better. He was directed by his superior at Conway
where he worked to take a bolt to Sumter for repair or replacement,
and was authorized to use the employer's vehicle to remain away
over the weekend if necessary, it being understood that he would
visit his family at Darlington. Instead of proceeding directly to
Sumter, he picked up his family who were visiting at Florence and
proceeded to take them home. The injury occurred on the highway
between Florence and Darlington. He went out of the way of direct
line to Sumter by twelve miles. The court concluded that the em-
ployee made a substantial deviation for personal convenience and
that this injury in the course of such deviation was non-compensable.
MUNICIPAL PowERs AFrECTING AWARD TO MUNICIPAL
The compensability of an injury to a janitor in the City Police
Department sustained when he was struck by an automobile while
on a mission for a prisoner to the prisoner's wife in a distant section
of the city was up-held in the case of Lomax v. City of Greenville.
4
It was held that, as a policy of the Police Department of many years
standing had allowed the use, of janitors for messenger purposes to
families of prisoners where telephone service was not available, to
the end that bail might be promptly arranged, this had become one
of the legal duties of such employee.
The court held that, although municipal corporations can only
exercise their inherent powers and such as have been conferred upon
3. 85 S.E. 2d 29 (S.C. 1955).
4. 225 S.C. 289, 82 S.E. 2d 191 (1954).
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them by the legislature in express terms or by reasonable implica-
tion, such corporations nevertheless have some discretionary pow-
ers within those spheres of power and that the duties prescribed by
the Police Department for the janitor in this case were in the exer-
cise of such discretion.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
(1) Anticipatory Award: The court held in Keeter v. Clifton
Manufacturing Com pany,5 that the Commission could not make an
award for partial disability "to project an award into the future by
holding, in effect, that if hereafter claimant's wages fell below those
earned previous to his injury, he would be entitled to partial dis-
ability based on such difference in earnings". The employee was paid
the temporary disability to which he was entitled. He resumed em-
ployment and was employed at the time of the award making an
average weekly wage in excess of that earned at the time of the in-
jury. The definition of partial disability as contained in Code of
Laws of South Carolina of 1952, Sections 72-10 and 72-152 was
under construction. "Disability" is defined by Section 72-10 as:
Incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the em-
ployee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any
other employment.
Payment for partial disability under Section 72-152 is required as
follows:
During such disability a weekly compensation equal to sixty
per cent of the difference between his average weekly wages
before the injury and the average weekly wages which he is able
to earn thereafter.
The court held that the Commission should issue its order only in
accordance with facts existing on the date of the order, the facts in
the present case showing no loss of earning power. It is intimated
however that in the proper case, on showing of actual incapacity not
accurately reflected by the employee's post-injury earnings, the latter
would not be conclusive. The danger of injustice where the injury
caused diminution in earnings subsequent to the time within which
an award may be reviewed under Section 72-359 was referred to as
a matter for legislative, and not judicial, attention.
(2) Employer's Liability Under Award Subsequently Reversed: In
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the case of Miller v. Springs Cotton Mills,6 another case was before
the court for construction of the following part of Section 72-356
of the 1952 Code:
In case of an appeal from the decision of the Commission on
questions of law, such appeal shall operate as a supersedeas for
thirty days only and thereafter the employer shall be required
to make payment of the award involved in the appeal or certi-
fication until the questions at issue therein shall have been fully
determined in accordance with the provisions of this Title.
The question was whether the employee was entitled to temporary
total disability in accordance with the original award of the Commis-
sion, "notwithstanding the fact that the said award has been re-
versed and claimant held not to have sustained an accidental injury."
The claimant relied on the construction given the Code Section
in Bannister v. Shepherd.7 The court in a divided opinion held that
under the circumstances the employer was not liable for temporary
disability accruing after the thirty days provided by the statute. The
award had been affirmed by the Full Commission on May 8, 1953.
On June 11th, the employer had served notice and grounds of appeal,
the record not being certified to the Court of Common Pleas until
June 30th. On July 12th, claimant had given notice of motion for
an Order requesting payment of the accrued amount, the motion be-
ing heard along with the appeal on July 21st. On August 27th, an
order of the circuit court had reversed the award, finding no accident,
or if an accident, no relation thereof to employment.
The court's decision was based on the fact that the decision, having
been reversed by the circuit court on its merits, there was no "award"
to be enforced, together with the fact that under the principle, "a
party who has received payment under a judgment subsequently
reversed must restore any advantages obtained thereby to his adver-
sary," the employee would be compelled to make restitution in any
event.
A forceful dissenting opinion by Justice Taylor, concurred in by
Chief Justice Baker, criticized the principal opinion as departing
from clear legislative intention. It referred to claimant's position
as analagous to that favored position of a wife suing for alimony,
Jeffords v. Jeffords,8 wherein a wife may receive temporary alimony
even though she may eventually lose the case for permanent alimony
6. 225 S.C. 326, 82 S.E. 2d 458 (1954).
7. 191 S.C. 165,4 S.E. 2d 7 (1939).
8. 216 S.C. 451, 58 S.E. 2d 731 (1950).
19551
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and attorney's fees on the trial of the case on its merits. The dis-
senting opinion stated further:
The principle set forth in the leading opinion would encourage
'justifiable delay' in hopes of making restitution convenient to
the employer.
The leading opinion was termed a nullification of the statute.
(3) Tine for Filing of Claim: in the case of Fox v. Union Buf-
falo Mills,9 an employee was injured on November 26, 1951 whose
attorney mailed a letter to the Industrial Commission on November
26, 1952, giving notice of injury and requesting a hearing. The let-
ter itself showed receipt in the office of such commission on Decem-
ber 1, 1952. The court held that the requirement of Section 72-303
of the 1952 Code of Laws that a claim be "filed with the Commission
within one year after the accident," was not met. The word "filed"
was held to mean "delivered to and received by the proper officer to
be kept on file."
It may be noted here that a subsequent legislative enactment of
date, May 5, 1955 amended Section 72-303 to provide that a regis-
tered letter, if mailed within one year after the accident, would satis-
fy the requirement of filing.
(4) Conflict in Medical Testimony: The case of Scott v. Havnear
Motor Co.' 0 reaffirmed the rule that in cases of conflict of medical
testimony, the power rest with the Commission and not the court
"to determine which diagnosis advanced by these physicians it would
accept." The deceased was sixty-six years old and a mechanic. He
suffered in a compensable accident a deep and extensive cut of the
forearm, bleeding profusely and suffering shock. He never resumed
work, and within two months died of a heart attack. After autopsy,
one pathologist thought death was produced by the accident's ag-
gravation of a long standing coronary condition; another pathologist
concluded there was no causal connection between the injury and
the death. A heart specialist testified that there could have been a
causal connection. The circuit judge in error held the evidence in-
sufficient and reversed an award, resulting in the court's re-affirma-
tion of the Commission's fact-finding powers.
(5) Enforcement of Award in Federal Court: The United States
Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, held in St. Paul-Mercury Indem-
9. 86 S.E. 2d 253 (S.C. 1955).
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nity v. Sylvan,11 that the award in Sylvan v. Sylvan Bros.'2 subse-
quently reversed by the South Carolina Supreme Court was not en-
forceable pending that appeal in a separate action instituted in the
United States District Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship
and on the theory that the award of Industrial Commission had
become a cause of action enforceable in the state courts. The plain-
tiff relied on the same provision of Code of Laws of South Carolina,
1952 Section 72-356 at issue in Miller v. Springs Cotton Mills,'3
providing that in case of appeal from decision of the Commission on
questions of law, such appeal shall operate as a supersedeas for thirty
days only,
The Court of Appeals cited the Miller case in support of its con-
clusion that this section was not intended to create a cause of action
but to "regulate procedure on appeal from an administrative award,
the payments therein required being enforceable by the state court
as an incident of its jurisdiction on review, not by action in an inde-
pendent tribunal." The court further referred to Section 72-357 of
the Code providing that judgment may be had only with respect to
an award "unappealed from" or "affirmed upon appeal." It regard-
ed the intervention of a federal court under such circumstances un-
justifiable "under principles of comity prevailing between courts of
coordinate jurisdiction."
LEwisiATIV RENACTMIENTS ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
In addition to the amendment allowing the filing of a claim by
registered mail within one year of the date of the injury above re-
ferred to (Amendment to Section 72-303 enacted May 5, 1955)
there were several amendments to Code Section 72-180 enacted May
11, 1955, increasing the allowance for burial expenses from Two
Hundred ($200.00) Dollars to Four Hundred ($400.00) Dollars
and substituting the word "spouse" for "wife" in the requirement
of dependency where the dependents are "in any foreign country."
11. 213 F. 2d 137 (4th Cir. 1954).
12. 225 S.C. 429, 82 S.E. 2d 794 (1954),
13. 225 S.C. 326, 82 S.E. 2d 458 (1954).
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